Abstract-The increasing need for physical security in critical environment has led to a widespread of video surveillance systems. Effective video surveillance systems should be able to detect the presence of unauthorized people in the monitored environments while preserving the privacy of authorized ones. To this aim, our paper proposes the adoption of the usage control model in the video surveillance scenario to enforce security policies that continuously control whether a person holds the right to stay in a give space (e.g., a room) from the moment when this person enters that space. In some scenarios, a person is allowed to stay in the room only under some circumstances, which are described by the usage control policy. When the policy is violated an action is taken, e.g., the video camera placed in the room enables the registration. This paper presents the architecture of the proposed framework, provides an example of usage control policy in a real scenario, and describes the main details of our prototype implementation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays video surveillance is widespread and it is widely adopted both in business and public environments for several reasons. First of all, the increasing need for security in critical rooms or spaces, then the availability of advanced (sometime called "smart") video surveillance systems at affordable costs. Several frameworks for video surveillance with advanced features, such as humans tracking, have been proposed in the scientific literature, and are already or will be soon available on the market. Companies may decide to adopt video surveillance systems to enhance the physical security of their meeting rooms, controlling people accesses to detect unauthorized ones. On the other side, video surveillance may become invasive for people's privacy. Hence, proper solutions should be developed to allow effective video surveillance in case of unauthorized accesses, while preserving the privacy of authorized people accessing the monitored rooms or spaces. This would also improve the acceptance of video surveillance by the people being monitored. This paper proposes a framework for video surveillance based on the usage control model aimed at defining flexible security policies to determine who is authorized to stay in a monitored room. The idea is that the video surveillance system continuously detects and identifies the people located in the monitored room, and evaluates the usage control policy to check whether they have the right to access the room. The usage control policy takes into account factors (attributes) paired with users, with the monitored rooms and with the environment. These factors change over time, and this could cause a policy violation. When the policy evaluation determines that one person is no longer authorized to stay in the room, an alert is raised, and the video stream recording is enabled.
The main novelty of our framework is to ensure that the security policy is continuously satisfied while people are in the room, besides simply deciding whether they are allowed to enter it. For example, let suppose that the policy of a company states that visitors must be always accompanied by an employee of the company when they are in the meeting room. This policy is a usage control policy that can be naturally expressed and enforced by the proposed framework, since it requires that "the presence of an employee in the room", is continuously verified while the visitor stays in that room.
Concluding, in this paper we mainly focus on how the usage control model can be exploited to satisfy the security needs of the video surveillance scenario while guaranteeing users' privacy. Instead, we adopt state of the art technologies for what concerns video stream processing, e.g., to perform face detection and recognition.
The structure of this paper is: Section II discusses the related work, while Section III describes some background concerning the usage control model and the technique we adopted for face recognition. Our usage control approach is presented in Section IV, while Section V describes the architecture of the proposed framework and some details of the prototype we implemented. Finally, Section VI draws the conclusions.
II. RELATED WORK
The following works make use of visual or cryptographic techniques to protect users' privacy. The authors of [17] propose the adoption of a PrivacyCams to encode video stream directly by cameras. Sensitive details are hided in the stream and only authorised people can access the raw data. The authors of [8] propose a privacy architecture for sensors, and in particular for video surveillance cameras. The idea of Fidelao et al. is to use a privacy buffer to detect and tag private data coming from sensors. Korshunov at al. in [9] use the warping algorithm to slightly different locations making the original face very difficult to be identified. Sohn et al. [18] propose something close to Korshunov. In fact, they use the JPEG Extended Range (JPEG ER) technique to scramble users' face on surveillance video content. Saini et al. [16] propose an interesting study on privacy leakage of a streaming coming from multiple cameras. The model they present establishes the privacy loss due to three main features: what (i.e. activities), when (i.e. time), and where (i.e. location).
The following works make use of policies to enable actions in specific conditions. Wickramasuriya et al. [19] suggest a solution that hides camera objects to keep users' privacy by specifying policies to access regions of the video stream. Birnstill et al. in [7] make use of usage-control system to define policies that are differently evoked on two operational modes and regulate the actions to execute the video stream. In particular, the default mode occurs in a normal/quite situations, and here an operator is not able to see the video stream coming from the cameras. While, on the alarm mode the camera shows the video stream to the operator.
In spirit similar to the above papers, our work propose a video-surveillance framework that embeds a usage-control system. However, Birnstill et al. in [7] use policies that are enforced to trigger actions to enable or disable the videorecording. So, the alarm mode is not triggered according to an attribute state evaluated by the police, but it is triggered by other external components. Then, the policies only manages the access to the video stream. Even in the work of Wickramasuriya et al. policies regulate the access to different region of the video stream, and moreover they use RFID as authentication system. We, instead, propose a video-surveillance framework that entrusts the management of users' identity to a face recognition algorithm, and uses policies to trigger alarms that active or deactivate the video-cameras registration.
III. BACKGROUND A. Usage Control Model
The Usage Control (UCON) model [12] , [14] , [15] , [21] extends traditional access control models introducing mutable attributes and new decision factors besides authorizations, i.e., obligations and conditions. Mutable attributes represent features of subjects, resources, and environment that change their values as a consequence of the access decision process, of the usage of the resources, or for other reasons. For instance, the number of people in a room, which changes every time a person enters or exits the room, is a mutable attribute paired with the object room. Since mutable attributes can be updated during the usage of an object, the usage control model evaluates the security policy before (pre-evaluation) and during the usage of the object (ongoing-evaluation). The continuous evaluation of the policy when the access is in progress reduces the risk of misuse of resources when the right is no more valid. Authorization are predicates which evaluated subject and object attributes, and the actions that the subject requested to perform on the object. Pre-Authorizations are evaluated when the subject requests to access the object, while ongoing-Authorizations are continuously evaluated while the access is in progress. Obligations are predicates which check that certain requirements have been fulfilled before the access (Pre-oBligations), or that are continuously fulfilled while the access is in progress (ongoing-oBligations). Conditions are requirements that evaluate environmental or system status (e.g., current time or current location).
The UCON model has been successfully adopted in many different scenarios. For example, in [20] , Sandhu et al. propose the adoption of their model in collaborative computing systems, such as the GRID environment. Their architecture is based on a centralized attribute repository, which works in push mode (i.e. the attributes are submitted to the authorization service by the user himself) for immutable attributes, and in pull mode (i.e. the attributes value are collected by the authorization service just before their use) for mutable attributes, and they use the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [13] to specify policies. The authors of [10] propose an usage control enforcement mechanism for applications. They show an implementation for a common web browser and they use their prototype to control data in a social network. The proposed mechanism allows the data owner to prevent data from being printed, saved, copied&pasted, etc., after this data has been downloaded by other users. The work in [11] , instead, proposes the adoption of the Usage Control model to regulate the usage of resources in Cloud IaaS services.
B. Face Recognition
Face recognition is used in contexts like video surveillance, authentication and access systems. However, in these scenarios is often difficult to recognise faces, since they can be affected by aging, facial expressions, changes in lighting and background, partial occlusions of the face, and so on.
Face recognition methods fall into two categories: i) featurebased and ii) holistic. The feature-based techniques first process the input image to extract and measure distinctive facial features such as the eyes, mouth, nose, and so on. Instead the holistic techniques identify faces using global representations, i.e., descriptions based on the entire image rather than on local features of the face.
As part of the Holistic techniques, we quickly introduce the Scale-Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT) algorithm used in our video surveillance architecture for face recognition. SIFT is a computer vision algorithm to detect and describe local features in images. It extracts features in four steps: i) locations of potential interest points; ii) discarding points with low contrast; iii) assigning an orientation to each key point based on local image features; iv) computing a local feature descriptor at each key point.
IV. USAGE CONTROL IN VIDEO SURVEILLANCE
The video surveillance framework proposed in this paper is based on the usage control model to enforce the security policy for the whole time a person stays in the monitored room. The basic idea is that when the system detects a person in the room, the video streams captured by the VCs are temporary recorded in a buffer until the person is identified and the pre-evaluation of the security policy is performed. The identification phase aims at determining the identity of the person, and it is performed by detecting the faces in the captured streams. Then, faces are compared with those ones that were previously stored in a database, called Faces Database. After the identification phase, the related set of attributes (such as the role in a company) are retrieved from an Attribute server. We use these attributes to perform the pre-evaluation of the security policy. If the result of the preevaluation is "deny", the person is not allowed to stay in that room, an alarm is triggered (e.g, he is asked to exit the room), the temporary video buffer is permanently copied in the video storage of the surveillance system, and the current video streams are recorded until the person leaves the room. Instead, if the result of the pre-evaluation is "permit", the person is allowed to stay in that room, the temporary video buffer is cancelled and the video streams are not registered. When the person is in the room, the policy is continuously evaluated (ongoing-evaluation) because some mutable attributes could change their values causing a policy violation. As soon as the policy is violated, the right of the person to stay in the room does not hold anymore, hence an alarm is triggered and the video streams captured by the VCs are recorded until the surveillance system detects that the person has left the room.
The advantages resulting from the adoption of the usage control model in video surveillance systems are clarified by the following example. Let us suppose that a company wants to regulate the access to some critical rooms of its department, and states that guests must be accompanied by an employee when they are in these rooms. In other words, visitors cannot enter alone and must not be left alone in some specified rooms of the company. This policy cannot be easily expressed using traditional access control models, but it can be naturally expressed and enforced by the proposed framework since it requires that a given authorization predicate, i.e., the presence of an employee in the room, is continuously verified. Table I shows a representation of this usage control policy in a human readable language, where the object (o) is one of the rooms to be protected by the usage control system, and the subjects (s) are the people who perform the actions (a) of entering the rooms. This policy is a part of a larger policy that regulates the accesses to all the monitored room of the company. In particular, this policy exploits the following attributes: o.id, which represents the ID of the rooms, a.id which represents the ID of the actions that are controlled by the policy, s.role represents the role of the subject "s" in the company, o.numEmployee which represents the number of employees who are in the room or in a given moment. The last attribute is obviously mutable. The policy consists of two rules: Rule-1 (lines 4-12), which regulates the access of the employee to the data center room, and Rule-2 (lines [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] , which regulates the access of guests to the same room. In particular, line 3 defines the ID of object protected by this policy, which is "CED"and represents the room that hosts the data center of the company.
The target of Rule-1 is the action of entering a room (line 6), and the pre-authorization in lines 7-8 allows the execution of the action when the subject has attribute role "employee". Table I  USAGE CONTROL POLICY EXAMPLE the pre-authorization is satisfied, the pre-update in lines 9-10 is executed, the value of the attribute numEmployee of the room is incremented, and it will be decremented by the post-update in lines 11-12 when the access terminates, i.e., the subject leaves the room.
Even, the rule-2 targets the action of accessing a room (lines [14] [15] . In this case the pre-authorization (lines [16] [17] states that the access is allowed if the subject has attribute role "guest", and the value of the attribute numEmployee of the room is greater then zero. The on-authorization in lines 19-20, which is continuously evaluated, state that the value of the attribute numEmployee of the room must be greater then zero during the access time as well.
Video Stream Elaborator
Room Manager Figure 1 shows the architecture of our usage control based video surveillance framework. Starting from the left side of the figure, the Video Cameras (VCs) capture the video streams that are used both for the identification process and video surveillance inside the rooms. In our reference scenario, we assume that a set of cameras are installed in the monitored room in a such way that nobody can stand in this room without being detected by a camera. In particular, these cameras send the captured streams to the Video Stream Elaborator (VSE), which detects whether one or more faces appears in them, i.e., whether somebody is in the room. In order to perform face detection, the VSE uses the Haar [6] feature-based cascade classifier. The VSE applies the classifier to each frame that it receives from the cameras. In case one or more faces are found, the VSE executes the face recognition step using the SIFT algorithm (Sec. III-B), which matches the detected faces with those ones stored into the Faces Database.
After the face recognition phase, the VSE sends to the Room Manager (RM) the ID of the person who has been identified, say A, along with her attributes retrieved from the Faces Database, e.g., her role. The RM manages a table that stores the IDs of the people currently in the room. In the case that A just entered the room, the RM exploits the embedded PEP to invoke the Usage Control service to perform the authorization process. The RM is also in charge of detecting when a user leaves the room to notify the Usage Control service.
The messages: tryaccess, permitaccess, denyaccess, revokeaccess, and endaccess are used in the interactions between the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) and the Usage Control service. They are derived from the usage control actions defined in [21] . The PEP creates the tryaccess request, including the data collected by the RM (i,e., userID, role, etc), every time that a new person enters the room. Then, the PEP sends the tryaccess request to the Usage Control service, and it receives a permitaccess or denyaccess response, which is enforced, respectively, by remaining silent or by triggering an alarm that starts the video recording. The PEP also notifies the Usage Control service by sending the endaccess message when a person leaves the room. In addition, the PEP is programmed to start the video recording when it receives the revokeaccess message from the Usage Control service, which states that the person in the room is no more allowed to stay there. Finally, the PEP enforces obligations included in the messages received from the Usage Control service, such as playing some announcements.
The Usage Control service consists of the Context Handler, Policy Decision Point, Session Manager, Policy Information Point and Access Table components. The Context Handler (CH) interacts with the PEP using the aforementioned messages. It coordinates the interactions with the other components of the service to perform the continuous evaluation of the policy. When the CH receives the tryaccess messages from the PEP, it performs the pre-evaluation phase. In particular, it interacts with the Policy Information Points (PIPs) to retrieve further attributes that could be required for the decision process, i.e., the attributes related to the user who entered the room, the room itself, and the environment. The PIPs adds the collected attributes in the access request and sends it back to the CH. In turn, the CH sends the access request message to the Policy Decision Point (PDP). It evaluates the request against the pre-policy (i.e., the policy including pre-authorization, pre-conditions, pre-updates, and preobligations only) and returns the access decision to the PEP. The access decision includes some pre-updates of attributes that the CH executes by exploiting the update interface of the involved PIPs. The ongoing-evaluation phase starts when the CH returned a positive response to the PEP as result of the pre-evaluation phase. In this case, the CH retrieves and subscribes the attributes required for the decision process exploiting the subscribe interface of the PIPs. Then, the CH sends the corresponding enriched access request to the PDP to evaluate the ongoing-policy (i.e., the policy including onauthorization, on-conditions, on-updates and on-obligations only), which could be different from the pre-policy. If the evaluation of the ongoing policy returns denyaccess, the CH sends the revokeaccess message to the PEP that starts the video recording, otherwise no action is taken. Due to the attribute subscriptions, the PIP notifies the CH when values of one (or more) attribute(s) involved in the access decision process changed. Even in this case, the CH coordinates the other components of the Usage Control service to perform the ongoing-policy re-evaluation exploiting the updated values of the mutable attributes. If an evaluation of the ongoing policy returns denyaccess, the CH sends the revokeaccess message to the PEP that starts the video recording.
The Policy Decision Point (PDP) is a XACML evaluation engine that takes a policy and an access request as the input, evaluates the policy for that request, and returns the access decision: allow or deny. Interactions with the PDP are performed following the format defined by the XACML standard [13] .
The Session Manager (SM) represents an extension of the XACML reference architecture. It is in charge of managing the usage sessions to implement the continuous enforcement of usage control policies while the accesses are in progress. The SM exploits the Access Table ( AT) to store data about ongoing sessions. The AT is implemented through a Database. Each entry refers to a session and it contains the session ID, the access request, the session status (i.e., pending, active, ended, revoked). The SM is invoked by the CH to create a new entry in the AT for each access request (tryaccess) that is allowed by the pre-evaluation phase, setting the session status in the entry to "active". The SM is then invoked to change the session status from "active" to "revoked" when the ongoing-evaluation of the policy does not allow the access anymore. Moreover, the SM is in charge of deleting the entries linked to ended accesses due to an endaccess message.
A. Architecture Development
To deploy the architecture depicted in Figure 1 we used a D-Link DCS-942L IP camera, which is able to capture up to 20 frames per second with a resolution of 640x480 pixels. That camera is accessible using the HTTP protocol, and also it provides a built-in night vision with sound and motion detection capabilities. The Video Stream Elaborator (VSE) is developed as a Java application and it uses JavaCV [4] to write functions for real-time computer vision, to access the camera video stream and to perform face detection operations.
Each face detected by the VSE is compared with the faces available in the Faces Database to find a match (if it exists). The database contains a jpg picture of about 200x200 pixels per each user user along with user attributes (i.e. name, role, etc.). The database is implemented using MySQL as DataBase Management System [5] , and the face recognition operation is executed with SIFT included in Fiji [3] , which is a Java image processing package for image transformation, registration and interpretation.
We adopt SIFT to identify faces due to its robustness to variation in scale and orientation. In our test we observed that SIFT achieves a true positive rate near to 100% when the pictures in the database have good lighting conditions. That percentage decreases proportionally with the variation of those conditions. However, it is worth noting that the false positive rate remains 0% even in different conditions.
After the face identification, the VSE shares the userID and the role attributes with the RM, and the latter interacts with the CH of the UCON service. The CH exploits the remote procedure call mechanism provided by the Apache XML-RPC library (v.3) to interact with the PEP embedded in the RM. Communications between CH and PEP use the XML-RPC protocol over HTTP since in our testbed the CH and the PEP are deployed on the same machine. However, extension to HTTPS is also supported by our prototype. The PDP has been implemented using the WSO2 Balana [2] , which implements an XACML engine that follows the XACML standard. The SM uses the Apache Derby [1] relational database engine to implement the AT, and the PIP manages the number of employee that are present in each observed room. PIP interfaces provide remote methods to retrieve, subscribe/unsubscribe and update operations exploiting XML-RPC over HTTP calls.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has proposed the adoption of a usage control based authorization system to decide whether one or more people are authorized to access and stay in a monitored room. We have validated our approach by developing a prototype of the proposed architecture and testing the enforcement of the policy described in Table I . We have presented a flexible architecture composed by two main parts: one regarding the authentication phase and another regarding the usage control phase. The choice to provide an architecture based on separate modules allows us to modify one part without altering the other. For instance, in this paper we decided to record the video stream only in case of policy violation to preserve the privacy of the monitored people. Different solutions may require more complex video processing techniques to preserve users' privacy. As an example, the Video Stream Elaborator could continuously record the video stream blurring the faces of the people when they are authorized to stay in the room, and record the video stream in clear when the policy is violated. As future work, to enhance users' privacy with respect to the external server, the VSE could be extended to support Secure-Two party Computation (STC) functions during face recognition step. With STC we would be able to authenticate people keeping a high level of their privacy.
